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Abstract
The prospect of a profound transformation in the relationship between the UK and the
European Union has raised a range of economic, social and political concerns (Dhingra et al.,
2016; Booth et al., 2015; Irwin, 2015; Ebell and Warren, 2016). Whilst the ultimate shape of a
negotiated post-Brexit settlement is uncertain, the potential loss or reduction in access to EU
funding streams, educational mobility, EU labour market access, and changes to employment
rights and regulations will impact significantly upon young people across the UK. Underlining
this, the transition between education and employment has been evidenced as a period when
young people experience increased risk of poverty and social exclusion (MacDonald, 2011;
Furlong and Cartmel, 2004; Ellison, 2014; ILO, 2016). This article provides an analysis of the
role of EU funding streams and operational programmes directed at young people’s transitions
between education and employment across the UK. The co-ordinated use of EU funding
instruments aimed at rebalancing economic and social inequalities between wealthier and
poorer regions and groups within the EU is evidenced as improving labour market outcomes
for young people living in the most disadvantaged regions of the UK. In light of this, the
article contends that future post-Brexit UK governments will need to develop redistributive
investment strategies within coherent policy architectures and inclusive forms of governance to
ensure the continued delivery of operational programmes for young people which are relevant,
effective and sustainable at a local level.
Introduction
As a growing body of evidence reveals, a post-Brexit Europe will have significant
implications for economies, labour markets and societies across Europe (Irwin,
2015; Dhingra et al., 2016; Booth et al., 2015). Whilst the economic, political and
social consequences of transformations in the relationship between the UK and
the rest of Europe are complex and uncertain, the population of the UK will
undoubtedly experience the most profound impact of a post-Brexit settlement.
The economic risks associated with the UK’s exit from the EU are set out in stark
relief by Dhingra et al. (2016).
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Although it is always hard to assess what the economic future may bring and
there are many uncertainties, we consistently find that by reducing trade, Brexit
would lower UK living standards.(Dhingra et al., 2016: 4)
Countering this argument the UK government has offered a more positive
prognosis arguing that Brexit will enable the UK to secure bilateral trade deals
with a broader range of nations outside the EU realising greater value to the UK
economy within a two-year period. (Davis, 2016). Further, the UK will be able
to secure tariff-free access to the EU single market as this arrangement would
be in the mutual interest of the EU and the UK. (Davis, 2016, ibid.) In a recent
White Paper (2017), the UK government has also argued that there will be greater
potential for control of inward investment following the repatriation of funding
from the EU to the UK.
8.51 Once we have left the EU, decisions on how taxpayers’ money will be
spent will be made in the UK. As we will no longer be members of the Single
Market, we will not be required to make vast contributions to the EU budget.
There may be European programs in which we might want to participate. If so, it
is reasonable that we should make an appropriate contribution. But this will be
a decision for the UK as we negotiate the new arrangements. (UK Government
(2017): White paper on the United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership
with the European Union: 5)
The potential economic benefits of the repatriation of funding from the
EU to the UK have been contested by a number of economists and financial
analysts. (McIver andWakefield, 2016; Ottaviano et al., 2014; Oxford Economics,
2016). A central area of concern is that the UK will no longer have access to the
European Investment Bank (EIB) which has provided substantial loans for UK
infrastructure projects since 1973 in sectors such as education, housing, health,
transport and energy. The EIB is the largest multi-lateral lending institution.
EU member states are shareholders in the EIB which delivers long-term loans
on a non-profit basis to member states. In 2015 the EIB invested €8bn in the
UK including €700 million for social housing in Northern Ireland and London
and €400 million for the development of the ports of Aberdeen and Liverpool.
The longer-term impacts of the repatriation of funding to the UK economy
and public infrastructure are thus reliant on the capacity of current and future
UK governments to develop coherent and sustainable policy and investment
strategies.
Critically, the current UK government argues that Brexit will also allow
greater scope to build upon andmodernise employment conditions andworkers’
rights in a ‘changing labour market’ (UK Government, 2017).
We are committed to maintaining our status as a global leader on workers’ rights and will make
sure legal protection for workers keeps pace with the changing labour market. Specifically, an
independent review of employment practices in the modern economy is now underway. The
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279417000356
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. SCD Lille III, on 21 Jul 2017 at 18:51:55, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
education to employment in post-brexit uk 3
review will consider how employment rules need to change in order to keep pace with modern
business models, such as: the rapid recent growth in self-employment; the shift in business
practice from hiring to contracting; the rising use of non-standard contract forms and the
emergence of new business models such as on-demand platforms. (UK Government, 2017,
ibid: White paper on the United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European
Union: 27)
Here the focus is on modern business models leading transformations in
employment rules and regulations rather than employment rules, regulations
and rights determining the shape of modern business models. This increased
emphasis on prioritizing the needs of the market (‘modern’ economy) and
‘modern’ business models strongly implies a market-led post-Brexit political
economy in the UK. Here the proposed shift from publically driven to market-
driven policy strategies is brought into sharp relief. The potential impact of
this shift on vulnerable groups in the UK labour market is a central concern.
Demonstrating this, non-standard contracts affect young people aged between
18 and 25 more than any other age group and young people hold over one-
third of all zero-hour contracts in the UK labour market (ONS, 2017; Otto and
Taylor-Gooby, 2014).
The potential consequences of a post-Brexit settlement for work and welfare
in the UK are of central concern particularly for vulnerable groups. Highlighting
this, recent research has evidenced the disproportionate impact of economic
uncertainty upon young people in the UK and across all European labour
markets (Tinson et al., 2016; ILO, 2015; Otto and Taylor-Gooby, 2014). Young
adults are now one of the most vulnerable groups across European societies
and beyond particularly in terms of poverty and social exclusion and the labour
market (Eurostat, 2017; ONS, 2017; Scottish Government, 2015; ILO, 2015). In
the UK this vulnerability has been compounded by societal risks, including
the marketisation of Higher Education in England and Wales, the imposition
of work and welfare reforms with high degrees of conditionality and flexible
labour market conditions. The latter are characterised by a high proportion of
part-time, temporary and zero-hour contracts contributing to fragmented and
incoherent youth transitions between education and employment (Tinson et al.,
2016; Ellison, 2014; MacDonald, 2011; Furlong and Cartmel, 2004). Moreover,
the loss of those EU funding streams directed at specific policy programmes for
young people is particularly concerning as these innovative policies andmeasures
have been evidenced as supporting and sustaining youth transitions between
education and employment (Ellison and Fenger, 2013; Ellison and Van Berkel,
2014). Moreover, the loss of the redistributive capacity of the European Social
Fund (ESF) and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) to regional
and local investment in the UK will exacerbate spatial inequalities unless future
UKgovernments implementpolicy instruments baseduponamore redistributive
fiscal and investment regime.
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279417000356
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. SCD Lille III, on 21 Jul 2017 at 18:51:55, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
4 marion ellison
With a focus upon the direct and indirect consequences of a post-Brexit
Europe on key areas including the future of broader EU funding streams, trade
rules, movement of labour, employment rights and regulations and educational
mobility, this article argues that the broader economic and societal risks of a post-
Brexit settlement may well have significant negative consequences for vulnerable
young people’s experience of work and the transition between education and
employment in the UK. The article is informed by major research undertaken
for the EU (FP7) INSPIRES project (2013 to 2016).
The political economy and governance of youth transitions in the UK
and Europe
For many young people across Europe the journey between education and
employment is impededby contours of economic, spatial, social, educational, and
health inequalities. (IPPR, 2017; European Commission, 2014; OECD, 2013; ILO,
2016; Tinson et al., 2016) The complex and multi-dimensional vulnerabilities
resulting from these conditions in the UK are well documented (MacDonald,
2011; Roberts, 2011; Thompson, 2011; Furlong and Cartmel, 2004; Ellison, 2014).
Demonstrating this, the deregulation of the labour market in the UK has
led to an increase in non-standard employment including an exponential rise
in zero-hour contracts, from 747,000 in 2015 to 903,000 in 2016: a 20 per cent
increase. Critically, 36 per cent of all zero-hour contracts were held by young
people aged between 16 and 24 in 2016 (ONS, 2017; ONS, 2014; Gardiner, 2014).
Recent studies have highlighted the long-term impact of poor job quality and
insecure conditions on the social and psychological well-being of young people
(Elliot, 2016; The Princes Trust, 2014; Ellison, 2014; Lindsay and Houston, 2011).
In the UK austerity measures have also led to lower levels of investment in
Business, Innovation and Skills (Figure 1). The long-term failure to address the
entrenched and systemic lack of investment in skills programmes, training and
education has led to a situation in which young people in the UK have lower skill
levels when compared to other OECD countries (OECD, 2016).
Expenditure on active labour market policies as a percentage of GDP in
the UK is well below the average ratio for all 28 countries in the EU. In 2011, the
most recent year for whichUK data is available for comparative purposes, the UK
spent only 0.23 per cent of its GDPon active labourmarketmeasures compared to
1.93 per cent in Denmark. The cumulative impact of under-investment in skills
training and labour market interventions is demonstrated by the percentage
of young people in the UK without basic skills (OECD, 2016). Moreover, the
European Social Inclusion monitor Social Justice Index Score for Child and
Youth Opportunity 2015, reveals the UK as being ranked below the EU average
for, and eighteenth out of, the 28 countries surveyed (Figure 2). In the UK, 32.6
per cent of children and young people were at risk of poverty and social exclusion
in 2016.
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Figure 1. (Colour online) Business Innovation and Skills
Source: ONS: Data Extracted 6th January, 2017
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Figure 2. (Colour online) Social Justice in the EU
Source: Social Justice in the EU – Index Report 2015: Social Inclusion Monitor Europe (own
calculations) Extracted 7th January 2017.
As Figure 3 (below) reveals, between 2008 and 2016 the levels of young people
who were neither in employment nor education and training were consistently
higher in the UK than a number of EU countries including Germany, Czech
Republic, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and Norway.
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Figure 3. (Colour online) Young people neither in employment nor in education and training
by sex, age and educational attainment level (NEET rates): January to April 2016
Source: Eurostat: Last update 03.05.17: Extracted on 07.05.17. Unemployed persons in neither
formal nor informal education and training. All ISCED 2011 levels
The impact of EU funding and policy strategies on young people’s
experience of work and the transition between education and
employment in the UK
Introduction
Policy responses to youthunemployment at EU level have crystallized around
the EU 2020 strategy Youth on the Move which focuses upon the vulnerability
of young people with low levels of education and calls for sustainable integrated
support measures to aid the transition from education to work within a global
knowledge economy. A central policy concern for the EU Commission has been
thebarriers andconstraints facedbyyoungpeoplewhoareneither in employment
nor in education or training (NEETs) (DG Call for proposals No. VP/2012/012).
In 2013, the EU launched The Youth Employment Package (YEP) including a
Youth Guarantee stipulating that all young people aged up to 25 should receive a
quality job offer, continued education, an apprenticeship or a traineeship within
four months of leaving formal education or becoming unemployed. All member
states are required to implement the Youth Employment Initiative.
The impact of EU funding on the digital skills sector
A key area of under-investment within the UK economy is the digital
skills sector. A recent report issued by the UK Government during May 2015
acknowledged this major long-term failure of policy before the General Election.
‘The UK is at tipping point: The country is not addressing its significant digital
skills shortage and an incoming Government urgently needs to resolve this’ (House
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of Lords Select Committee on Digital Skills, Report of Session 2015: 12). Here, a
significant lack of government investment and coordination of digital initiatives
led to certain sectors of society, and UK regions, falling behind at a significant
cost to the UK economy. Investment in Information and Communication
Technologies in the UK is heavily reliant upon EU funding and £256 million
was to be invested through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)
between 2014 and 2020. The European Commission has also actively supported
the development of programmes enabling young people to develop skills within
the digital sector (European Commission, 2016).
The redistributive function of European funding
Between 2014 and 2020 the European Social Fund and European Regional
Development Fund will invest a total of 11.8 billion across six operational
programmes in theUK;England,Gibraltar,Wales,Northern IrelandandScotland
(Eurostat, 2017). The funds aim to reduce economic and social inequalities
between the EU’s regions, supporting economic development in poorer regions.
Wales is one of the UK’s poorest regions which was set to receive €2.4 billion
between 2014 and 2020, the highest level of funding of any region in the UK. In
contrast, the south-east of England will receive only €286 million as it is one of
the wealthiest regions of the UK. Recent impact evaluations have underlined the
pivotal impact of EU structural funds in stimulating and sustaining employment
in poorer regions in the UK. Here, it has been estimated that ERDF projects have
created approximately 36,640 jobs in Wales, 20,149 jobs in Yorkshire and 44,311
jobs in Scotland (Hunt et al., 2016)
European Social Funding is also critical to the redistributive function
of European funding. In the UK €206 million was allocated to the Youth
Employment Initiative from 2013 with the aim of addressing youth poverty
and social exclusion by reducing youth unemployment and improving access
to skills and training. Pivotal to YEI funding is the encouragement of
investment in intermediate and higher level skills, qualifications, training
and quality apprenticeships. Whilst the YEI offers targeted funding, broader
funding instruments including the EU Growth and Employment Fund, the
Sustainable Growth Fund, the Regional Convergence Fund and the Seventh
Framework Fund have also supported the redistribution of economic and
social investment in the UK contributing to more coherent and sustainable
youth transitions across the UK. As Table 1 (below) illustrates, levels of EU
investment across the UK increased year on year between 2011 and 2015.
Increasing levels of EU Expenditure in the UK rose from €6,579 million
in 2011 to €7,547.6 million in 2015 (Eurostat, 2017). Figure 4 illustrates the
composition of this funding. The development of an effective post-Brexit
investment strategy will need to take full account of the economic, social
and spatial redistributive function of this investment and will need to
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Figure 4. (Colour online) EU Expenditure within the UK between 2011 and 2015
Source: Eurostat, 2017: Figures extracted 14th January 2017
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TABLE 1. Allocation of EU Youth Employment Initiative Funding: 2014–2020
Member
State
Regions eligible for extra
funding under the Youth
Employment Initiative
Youth Employment
Initiative specific
allocation (€million)∗
Youth Employment
Initiative specific
allocation (€million,
current prices)∗
Belgium Yes 39.64 42.44
Bulgaria Yes 51.56 55.19
Czech
Republic
Yes 12.71 13.60
Denmark No – –
Germany No – –
Estonia No – –
Ireland Yes 63.66 68.14
Greece Yes 160.24 171.52
Spain Yes 881.44 943.50
France Yes 289.76 310.16
Croatia Yes 61.82 66.18
Italy Yes 530.18 567.51
Cyprus Yes 10.81 11.57
Latvia Yes 27.10 29.01
Lithuania Yes 29.69 31.78
Luxembourg No – –
Hungary Yes 46.49 49.77
Malta No – –
Netherlands No – –
Austria No – –
Poland Yes 235.83 252.44
Portugal Yes 150.20 160.77
Romania Yes 99.02 105.99
Slovenia Yes 8.61 9.21
Slovakia Yes 67.43 72.17
Finland No – –
Sweden Yes 41.26 44.16
United
Kingdom
Yes 192.54 206.10
Total 3000 3211
Source: EU Commission, 2014 ∗Member States have to match these amounts by at least the
same amounts from their European Social Fund allocation.
provide sufficient investment to ensure the continuity of policy programmes
and measures that are crucial to economic and social development across
the UK.
YEI funding was introduced in 2013 to enable young people who live in areas
of poverty and social exclusion to overcome some of the barriers and challenges
that they encounter as they undertake the transition between education and
employment. As Table 1 below shows, the UK has benefited significantly from
this extra funding in comparison to many other EU countries.
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Crucially the funding gaps faced by local, regional and national governments
in the UK following withdrawal from the European Union are compounded
by an equally profound challenge of governance. Central principles of social
partnership designed to increase the effectiveness of EC regional policies at local
level have guided the implementation of ESF funding across Europe since 1988
(The EUCommission, 2014; (Schraad-Tischler, 2015) Barca, 2009;). Collaborative
social partnerships between trade unions, employer organisations and other key
stakeholders at local level are encouraged and indeed required by EU funding
rules. Innovative and sustainable measures designed to support young people’s
transitions from education to employment at local level have emerged as a result
of the development of collaborative social partnerships (European Commission,
2014).
The redistributive role of ERDF and ESF funding in the UK
European Regional Development and European Social Funding play a
significant role in reducing economic and social inequalities between the regions
of the EU. During the period 2014–2020 the UK will receive €10.9 billion in
ERDF and ESF funding. Poorer regions in the UK including the north-east
of England, the south-west of England, Wales and Northern Ireland receive
more substantial levels of ERDF/ESF funding than wealthier regions. A primary
role of ERDF funding is to stimulate local economic development (European
Commission, 2010). Consolidating this, ESF-funded projects are designed to
ensure that children and young people from disadvantaged regions of Europe
benefit directly from increased access or enhanced access to educational, training
and employment opportunities (The Official Journal of The European Union,
2013; European Commission, 2014).
The south-west of England
As a European-designated deprived region, the south-west of England
benefits significantly from EU funding. Young people in the region have access
to projects funded through EDRF convergence funding and ESF funding. A
recent audit of ERDF/ESF performance indicators 2007–2014 for the south-west
of England has underlined the positive impact of EU co-funded projects. Here,
Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly have particularly benefited fromEU fundingwhen
impact is considered on a per capita basis (Table 2, below)
During the current funding period 2014–2020 the south-west region has
established a number of EU funded projects focusing upon education, and skills
development for young people making the transition between education and
employment. Additionally emphasis is being placed on enabling lower paid
workers to develop their careers through skills development. Apprenticeship
programmes incorporating globally recognised industry qualifications are also
an important component of the portfolio of EU-funded projects in the region.
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TABLE 2. ERDF/ESF performance indicators 2007–2014: the south-west of
England
ERDF/ESF performance indicators 2007–2014 For the south-west of England
Indicator
Cornwall and Isles
of Scilly
South West
England
Gross new jobs created 4761 4226
Number of RTD (Research, Training and Development)
projects supported
10 19
Number of projects investing directly in SMEs 68 9
Number of start-ups supported 22 1294
Private sector investment induced (€million) 121.5 22
Source: South West Greenerin.org.UK
The north-east of England
Despite having the lowest GDP per capita in England, the north-east of
England is not one of the poorest regions in the EU as a whole. Exceeding 75 per
cent of the average GDP in the EU, it is not entitled to European Funding under
the European convergence of regions objective. Under the convergence criteria,
poor regions receive more than 80 per cent of ERDF funding which provides
financial support to projects that stimulate regional development. The north-east
of England is, however, entitled to funds designated for regional competitiveness,
employment and regional development.
Wales
Wales has been a recipient of EU policy funding particularly EFSI, ERDF and
ESF funding, since the creation of the National Assembly for Wales in 1999, and
WestWales and theValleys continues to be classified by the EU as a ‘less developed
region’ being eligible for maximum levels of EU Cohesion and Structural policy
investment. Between 2014 and 2020 Wales was to gain £1.9 billion in structural
funding. Policy programmes for youngpeople are focused on education, training,
skills and educational mobility across Europe (The Welsh Government, 2017).
Northern Ireland
InNorthern Ireland close policy alignment betweenEU 2020policy strategies
and those of the Northern Ireland devolved administration are evidenced by
an emphasis on programmes for vulnerable young people who are neither
unemployed nor in education or training. Northern Ireland was to receive
€3.5 billion between 2014 and 2020 for programmes such as Belfast Works and
the LEMIS. The LEMIS project delivers free skills training as part of Northern
Ireland’s ESF programme to combat poverty and social exclusion and increase
the skills base of those currently in work.
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Concern relating to the impact of Brexit on these programmes has been
voiced by a number of organisations including the CBI in Northern Ireland. The
Director of the CBI in Northern Ireland has recently stated that:
Ourmembers are very fearful of thewithdrawal of EUFunding for investment and skills training
(Angela MacGowan, Northern Ireland Director of the CBI: Radio Four Today Programme
10/5/2017).
Of greater concern is the impact that the constitutional challenges raised by the
UK’s withdrawal from the European Union will have on the peace process in
Northern Ireland. Since 1995 Europe has paid €1.3 billion to support peace in
Northern Ireland and the border counties in the Republic of Ireland through
the PEACE and Interreg programmes (The Northern Ireland Government
Department of Economy, 2016).
Scotland
In Scotland, recent research conducted by the INSPIRES EU (FP7) research
project has evidenced the significance of EUco-funded collaborative partnerships
between trade unions, employer organisations, local authorities and further and
higher educational institutions in promoting more sustainable measures aimed
at supporting young people as they make meaningful and coherent transitions
between education and employment (Ellison, 2013).
As the case studies drawn from England, Wales, Northern Ireland and
Scotland show, young people undertaking the transition between education and
work in the UK benefit substantially from funding allocated by the European
Commission. The redistributive function of the EU budget and direct multi-level
governance arrangements between the EU and local administrations in the UK
are intrinsically woven into regional development policies across the UK (OECD,
2016).
The design and implementation of a post-Brexit investment strategy will
require full cognisance of these challenges. The continuity of progressive
policy measures and programmes which effectively support coherent and
meaningful youth transitions necessitates a commitment by the UK government
to the redistribution of economic, industrial and social investment across
the UK. Moreover, as previously evidenced, the effective implementation and
sustainability of these programmes also requires a political commitment to
progressive governance and social partnership arrangements. The evidential base
presented in this article has demonstrated the positive impact of existing forms
of multi-level governance and social partnership arrangements between the EU
and local stakeholders in the UK. The challenge is to ensure continuity of these
arrangements in order to provide young people with forms of local support, and
employment opportunities to enable them to navigate the challenges and barriers
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1. Newquay Aeronautical Engineering Apprentices – Cornwall  
The first group of aeronautical engineering apprentices to be trained in conjunction with 
Newquay Cornwall Airport graduated after a 2-year programme. They all now work with 
aviation maintenance companies in Cornwall and elsewhere in the UK and Europe.  
The core apprenticeship was funded through the SEMTA National Apprenticeship Agreement 
with the Skills Funding Agency with additional support from ESF Convergence.  
2. New Futures – South West of England 
With support from the European Social Fund (ESF), the ‘new futures’ project aims to improve 
education, training and employment opportunities for offenders in the south west.  
3. Raising Aspirations Project – Cornwall  
The ESF Raising Aspirations project (RAP) helps low-skilled people, particularly women, 
develop their careers through learning and training.  
Figure 6. (Colour online) Projects aimed at facilitating education and skills development for
young people in the south-west of England: 2014–2016
Source: South West Greenerin.org.uk
Between 2007 and 2014 the North East Region received £195.4 million in ESF funding and £296.8 million in ERDF 
funding, a per-capita investment of £73 and £114 respectively. A central objective of ESF funding is to enable 
children and young people from disadvantaged regions to gain increased access to educational, training and 
employment opportunities reinforcing coherent and meaningful transitions between education and employment. This 
funding is matched by co-funding organisations including The Department for Work and Pensions and the Skills 
Funding Agency (SFA). Between 2007 and 2014 this region gained £198.2 million from co-funding organisations. 
Projects which benefited from this investment included Gateshead College (£10, 753,750); New College Durham 
£8,557,950; and DWP Working Links £8 million. All of these projects contribute significantly to youth transitions 
between education and employment in the North East of England.  
Figure 7. (Colour online) The contribution of ERDF/ESF funding to youth transitions in the
north-east of England 2007–2014
Source: North East Local Enterprise Partnership (2017), http://www.nelep.co.uk/ [accessed on
619 26.02.2017]
they face in sustaining coherent and meaningful transitions between education
and employment.
Rebalancing regional disparities in labour market conditions for young
people; the role of EU redistributive funding instruments in the UK
Economic and industrial strategies, characterised by a concentration of
public and private investment within the south of the UK, are starkly
demonstrated below by changes in workforce jobs between 2015 and 2016
(Figure 6 below). Notably, both the north-west of England and Scotland
experienced a reduction in workforce jobs during this period, losing 5,000 and
7,000 workforce jobs respectively, with the north-east of England, Wales and
Northern Ireland experiencing small increases of between 2000 workforce jobs
for the north-east of England and 8000workforce jobs forNorthern Ireland, with
Wales experiencing an increase of only 6000workforce jobs during this period.
Despite this trend, levels of youth unemployment in all five areas decreased
between 2015 and 2016 with consistent downward trends in levels of youth
unemployment continuing in Scotland, the north-east, the north-west and
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The Welsh Government has focused upon ways in which complementary opportunities between EFSI and the EU 
Structural Policies and Funds could be combined with the use of the Erasmus+ programme in the overall EU 
strategy to facilitate educational reform and more effective practice in Wales and across Europe. The Welsh 
Government promoted training and educational policies and initiatives which emphasised the importance of 
European wide opportunities. Focusing upon these synergies the main concern of the Welsh Government is to 
“clarify and streamline the choice of tracks which young people are able to follow in their increasingly difficult 
transition from education to the world of work. Whether through apprenticeship schemes, further vocational 
education and training, introduction to work experience and entrepreneurial projects, or pathways to higher 
education. The crucial point for us in Wales as elsewhere in Europe is to build a system which enables the individual 
to make progress and, if he or she wishes, move between the available tracks with the necessary recognition and 
credit to build his or her own career pathway”. Source: The Welsh Government, 2017. European Territorial Co-
operation Programmes. 
Figure 8. (Colour online) Policy strategies directed at youth transitions in Wales
The Welsh Government (2017), European Territorial Cooperation Programmes. http://gov.
wales/funding/eu-funds/european-cooperation/?lang=en [accessed on 14.03.2017]
The EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation is a unique Structural Funds programme supporting progress 
towards a peaceful society in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland which has contributed substantially 
to peace in the region since 1995. The people of Northern Ireland have benefited from a €229m contribution from 
The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) with 15% matching funding from the Northern Ireland 
Executive and the Irish government. For young people in Northern Ireland any semblance of a coherent and stable 
future relies on continued political and economic investment in peace in the region and it may be argued that the 
political and economic impact of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union combined with the loss of pro-
active political support and funding for the peace process which the EU has shown since 1995 may severely 
jeopardise economic and political stability in Ireland. Public recognition of the role that the EU has played in the 
social and economic development of the region was reflected in EU Referendum vote to remain in the EU (56.8% 
vote to remain) (European Commission, 2000). 
Figure 9. (Colour online) The EU programme for peace in Northern Ireland
Source: European Commission (2000), EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in
Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland 2000–2004. Operational Programme
“Reinforcing Progress towards a Peaceful and Stable Society and Promoting Reconciliation” 1–
278, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/country/overmap/pdf_region/fp2mc_en.pdf
[accessed 05.03.2017]
Northern Ireland. Whilst a range of factors have influenced youth employment
levels, the evaluation of impacts from specific ESF/ERDF-funded projects in these
areas underlines the contribution of ESF/ERDF funding in stabilizing, and indeed
decreasing, levels of youth unemployment in regions which have experienced
significant reductions in workforce jobs during this period. Significantly, as
Figure 14 (below) reveals, four of these regions have also benefited from higher
levels of per capita combined ESF and ERDF allocations when compared with
other regions within the UK. Scotland’s allocated levels of combined ESF and
ERDF funding per capita are not as high as the other four regions being
similar to levels allocated to Yorkshire and Humberside and the East Midlands.
However, the current Scottish Government has demonstrated high levels of
engagement with the European Commission in developing and co-funding
projects, multi-level governance arrangements and delivery strategies to support
multi-sectorial policies designed to reduce inequality and poverty as part of
the ‘Solidarity Purpose’. (Scotland Europa, 2017; Scottish Government, 2015)
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The European Skills Panorama provides data and informaon relang to labour markets and skills needs across 
Europe facilitang the development of educaon and training systems which are more closely aligned to labour 
market needs parcularly with regard to knowledge-based and technological skill demand. The skills intelligence 
in Scotland aims to provide a closer alignment between investment in educaonal and training programmes 
demand across Europe. Regional Skills Assessments and Regional Skills Investment Plans (RSIPs) have also 
developed to enable regions to formulate and develop proacve programmes and measures to meet changing 
needs at local, naonal, UK and European level. Demonstrang this approach the Scosh Government 
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soware. The course is accredited by the Scosh Qualiﬁcaons Agency. Moreover the course is a 
Development Award (PDA) which has gained internaonal recognion. The Scosh Government is 
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Figure 10. (Colour online) Scotland: Alignment with the European Skills Panorama
Source: Scottish Government (2015a), Scotland’s Action Plan for EU Engagement.
The Scottish Government. Edinburgh. 1–14. March 27th, 2015, http://www.gov.scot/
Resource/0047/00473826.pdf. [accessed 20.02.2017] and Scottish Government (2015b),
European Parliament Engagement Report on Skills Policies for Fighting Youth Unemployment.
The Scottish Government, Edinburgh. http://www.gov.scot/Topics/International/Europe/
Case-Studies/YouthUnemployment [accessed 19.02.2017]
Figure 11. (Colour online) Change inworkforce jobs, by region, seasonally adjusted, September
2015 and September 2016
Source: Office for National Statistics (2017), Labour Force Survey: regional labour
market statistics. http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/subnational-labour/regional-labourmarket
statistics/january-2014/stb-regional-labour-market-january-2014.html [accessed 06.04.2017]
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Figure 12. (Colour online) Regional unemployment by age: 18–24 years in theUK between 2014
and 2017
Source: Office for National Statistics (2017), Labour Force Survey: regional labour market
statistics. line, http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/subnational-labour/regional-labour market-
statistics/january-2014/stb-regional-labour-market-january-2014.html [accessed 06.04.2017]
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Figure 13. (Colour online) Regional unemployment by age: 18–24 years in the UK between 2011
and 2014
Source: Office for National Statistics (2017), Labour Force Survey: regional labour market
statistics. line, http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/subnational-labour/regional-labour market-
statistics/january-2014/stb-regional-labour-market-january-2014.html [accessed 06.04.2017]
Significantly, London and the West Midlands both had high levels of youth
unemployment between January 2016 and August 2016 despite significant growth
in workforce jobs between September 2015 and September 2016. The level of
youth unemployment in London between January 2016 and August 2016 was
18.1 per cent despite a substantial increase in total workforce jobs of 103,000
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Figure 14. (Colour online) PerCapita combinedESF andERDF allocations by region (in Euros)
Source: SPERi: British Political EconomyBrief.No 24: UKRegions andEuropean Structural and
Investment Funds https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130703/
text/130703w0003.htm#130703w0003.htm_wqn31 http://parliament.uk/business/publications/
written-questionsanswers-statements/written-question/Commons/2016-03-22/32053/
between September 2015 and September 2016 (ONS, 2017). It is significant that,
at €96 per capita between 2014 and 2020, London receives one of the lowest
allocations of combined ESF and EDRF funding in the UK. Contrastingly, the
level of youth unemployment in Wales between January 2016 and August 2016
was 11.0 per cent despite the fact that the region benefited from a very slight
increase in workforce jobs, at 8,000 during this period. Critically, however, Wales
also benefited from the highest allocations of per capita combined ESF and
ERDF allocations of all regions during this period. It may be argued that the
level of youth unemployment in Wales is lower than youth unemployment in
London during this period due to targeted programmes and higher levels of
investments aimed at young people’s sustained transition between education and
employment inherent in a number of ESF/EDRF funded projects. Conversely,
despite strengthening labour market conditions (growth of 100,000 jobs during
the period), Local Enterprise Partnerships in London have access to lower levels
of EU funding resulting in lower levels of targeted investment in projects which
benefit young people as they undergo their transition between education and
the labour market. In particular, in terms of growth sectors, there is a higher
demand for highly skilled and professional workers in London necessitating the
availability of training in higher skills. Here, the alignment between forms and
levels of skills training for young people and available job opportunities within
distinct local labour market settings is critical. Enabling young people to gain
access to forms of skills training and knowledge development relevant to a global
knowledge economy is widely regarded as central to more resilient and inclusive
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labourmarkets (Tomlinson, 2013; European Commission, 2016; EU, 2015; OECD,
2016).
Young people in Wales have gained access to projects funded by the ESF and
the targeted YEI with the focus upon ‘individual persons rather than structures’
(Official Journal of the EU, 2013: 19). Demonstrating this, current ESF-funded
projects in Wales include the West Wales and the Valleys European Social Fund
Programme (£650m EU grant at current exchange rate) aimed at effectively
supporting people into work and upskilling those people in work but at risk
because of a lack of appropriate skills (Rhondda Cynon Taf County Borough
Council, 2016).
The contribution of European Funding to co-funded ESF/SFA(Skills
Funding Agency) apprenticeships in England is significant. The UK government
has proposed that it will create an additional three million apprenticeships by
2020. The current UK government plans to replace the EU funding element for
apprenticeships (co-financed ESF/SFA) with a business levy by April 2018. This
raises important issues for the sustainability of apprenticeships particularly in
regions with weaker economic profiles.
The UK’s withdrawal from the EU and the termination of EU funding
As the evidence above has demonstrated, a large number of UK programmes
and projects directed at vulnerable young people in the UK are co-funded by
the European Social Fund. When combined with substantial levels of EDRF
funding provided for local economic development in poorer areas of the UK the
impact of the withdrawal of this funding will be substantial. The House of Lords
European Union Committee Report (2017) clearly outlines the legal provisions
of Article 50 upon the withdrawal of EU funding. Critically, the European
Commission has provided a very clear description of the impact of two options
for withdrawal from the EU under Article 50. The first by agreement would set
out “the arrangements for theUK’s withdrawal in an orderlymanner as under the
terms of the Vienna Treaty, any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties
created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination”. Such issues
would include ongoing legal and financial obligations under the Own Resources
Decision, the Multiannual Financial Framework, and the Annual Budget. The
withdrawal agreement could also include a dispute resolution mechanism, in
case of future disagreement. Once the withdrawal agreement enters into force,
Article 50(3) TEU makes clear that the EU “Treaties shall cease to apply to the
State in question.” (House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union,
2017: Brexit and the EU Budget Appendix 3: Advice by the Legal Adviser to the
European Union Committee—The UK’s obligations under the EU Budget on
withdrawal from the EU without a withdrawal agreement: 21)
Crucially this would enable the negotiation of clear transitional
arrangements for funding including the retention of specific EU programmes
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or areas of cooperation. In this case, projects and programmes currently funded
by the EU would be able to plan for either the eventual withdrawal of funding
or continued cooperation and funding opportunities negotiated within the final
settlement. In particular the inclusion of a dispute-resolution mechanism in
the case of future disagreement would provide some safeguards and security
for projects currently funded by the EU for the effective transition from EU
co-funding to UK Government/Business co-funded arrangements.
The stark reality for projects currently directed at vulnerable young people
in the UK is that all EU funding will cease immediately if no agreement is reached
between the UK and the European Commission within the two-year time period.
The ‘travaux pre´paratoires’ (preparatory work) states that the two-year cut-off
was inserted to ensure that the right of a member state to withdraw from the
EU was unilateral, rather than dependent on the conclusion of a withdrawal
agreement.
The second option is stark: if no agreement is reached within two years, the effect is exactly
the same as if a withdrawal agreement had been agreed and entered into force: the EU ‘Treaties
shall cease to apply to the State in question’ (Article 50(3) TEU). The second option allows,
therefore, for the most disorderly of withdrawals.’(House of Lords Select Committee on the
European Union: Brexit and the EU Budget Appendix 3: 21)
Thus, the approach of the UK Government during the Brexit negotiations
is critical to transitional arrangements for EU co-funded projects directed at
vulnerable young people in the UK.
Conclusion
As the evidence above has demonstrated, the impact of the UK’s withdrawal
from the EU on young people making the transition between education and
employment in a post-Brexit UK will be significant. If an agreement is reached,
the scope for transitional arrangements and the replacement of EU funding for
co-funded projects will significantly mitigate these impacts particularly where
specific EU programmes continue after the UK’s exit from the European Union.
Despite this, the broader implications of the loss of the spatial redistributive
capacity of EDRF funding, addressing regional economic and labour market
disparities, and ESF funding, directed at alleviating youth poverty and social
exclusion through local targeted programmes, are of particular concern. In
particular, the loss of EU co-funding of programmes designed to support
vulnerable young people as they make the transition between education and
employment will be considerable unless the UK government fully replaces this
funding. This reassurance will become particularly vital in the event of no
agreement being reached with the European Union. The unilateral decision to
leave the EUwithout a negotiated settlementwill lead to a disorderly exit from the
EU and the immediate withdrawal of European support for UK projects (House
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of Lords, 2017). In light of this the UK government has recently proposed a levy
on businesses to ensure that EU co-funded apprenticeship schemes across theUK
continue. This proposal is consistent with the current UK government’s focus
on business-led transformations in employment rules and regulations rather
than employment rules, regulations and rights determining the structure of
modern business models. Critically this increased emphasis on prioritizing the
needs of the market (‘modern’ economy) and ‘modern’ business models strongly
implies a market-led post-Brexit political economy in the UK if the current
government retains power following the General Election on 8 June 2017 (UK
Government, 2017). The disproportionate impact of this transformation on the
employment conditions of vulnerable young people in the UK is of particular
concern as young people aged between 18 and 25 hold more non-standard
contracts than any other age groupwith over one-third of all zero-hours contracts
in the UK labour market being held by young people (ONS, 2017). A central
concern is the extent to which representatives of vulnerable groups and trade
unions will have a voice in the ‘Independent review’ of employment practices
and subsequent changes in employment rights and regulations following the
UK’s exit from the European Union (UK Government, 2017). Further, the
degree to which new forms of co-funding will deliver continuity in providing
effective and locally relevant programmes for vulnerable young people is highly
contingentupon thedevelopmentofpolicy architectures and formsof governance
which enable collaborative design, delivery, evaluation and sustainability of local
programmes. When combined with societal risks associated with the withdrawal
of EU employment rights and protections, educational mobility schemes and
transnational apprenticeships, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will herald
a period of increased insecurity and vulnerability for a whole generation of
young people in the UK. An initial glance through the looking glass into the
uncertainties of life in a post-Brexit UK led 71 per cent of young people between
the ages of 18 and 24 to vote to remain in the European Union in 2016 (YouGov,
2016). Unlike Lewis Carroll’s imagined world in which Alice regards herself as
courageous inovercoming theunnerving fantasy figures that threatenher identity
and her future (Carroll, 1865), the economic, social and personal challenges
currently faced by vulnerable young people in the UK are very real and will be
exacerbated in a post-Brexit Europe. The need to develop inclusive and coherent
policy architectures, forms of governance and spatially redistributive investment
strategies which support locally relevant sustainable programmes for young
peoplewithin a post-BrexitUK is nowanurgent priority of current and futureUK
governments.
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